

**流动性应急预案**

**Contingency Funding Plan**

中国银行纽约分行

Bank of China USA

2021年09月

Last Updated: September, 2021

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Version** | **Date Changes Made** | **Author** | **Description of Changes** |
| 1.0 | June, 2016 | TRD | Initial Creation |
| 1.1  1.2 | April, 2017  April, 2018 | TRD  TRD | Update  Update |
| 1.3  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.3 | October, 2018  May, 2019  August, 2019  November, 2020  September, 2021 | TRD  TRY  TRY  TRY  TRY | Update  Update  Update  Update  Updated CFP flow and communication process; aligned with current contingency liquidity/funding sources and estimations of countermeasures |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Identifying Information** |  |
| **Title** | Contingency Funding Plan |
| **Policy Owner** | Treasury |
| **Contact Information** | Peng, Qian  Zhang, Peng |
| **Effective Date** | September, 2021 |
| **Location** | J:\Liquidity and Funding Team\1. Policy & Procedures\1.2 BOC USA Policy & Procedures\Liquidity Funding Procedures 2021\CFP |
| **Document Type** | CFP |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Approved by** |  |  | | |
| **Asset and Liability Committee** |  | |  |  |
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# 1. 介绍Introduction

中国银行纽约分行及其下属分支机构（以下统称为“纽约分行”）流动性应急预案（以下简称“应急预案”）是中国银行股份有限公司（以下简称“中国银行”）纽约分行应对流动性危机确保及时偿付的操作手册。该预案规定了应急管理框架及相关授权，确保危机发生时中国银行反应迅速，特别是保护我行的债权人、债务人及其他投资者。本文档旨在说明不同流动性压力水平下可采取的重要决策。The BOC New York Branch and its satellite branches (collectively “BOCNY”)Contingency Funding Plan (“CFP”) serves as an operating plan for BOCNY during a liquidity crisis to ensure obligations are met in a timely manner. The CFP defines the emergency management framework and delegations that allows BOC to rapidly respond in stressed liquidity situations. This rapid response enables BOC to protect depositors, creditors and the investors. The document outlines various tactical and strategic countermeasures which may be used in different levels of liquidity stress.

纽约分行应急预案描述了中国银行迅速识别流动性风险并作出恰当、及时地行动以减轻并管理纽约分行风险敞口的方法。流动性压力测试情景中的预警指标与每月流动性压力测试结果相结合，对可能出现的潜在流动性风险事件进行预警管理。The BOCNY CFP outlines the methodology BOC will use to identify liquidity concerns promptly and provide appropriate and timely responses to minimize and manage risk exposures for the BOCNY. These early warning indicators for liquidity stress scenario identification in conjunction with the monthly liquidity stress testing results will alert management to the emergence of potential liquidity events.

定期测试纽约分行应急预案的各组成部分，确保各机构在流动性危机出现时做好相应准备。这包括流动性危机处理小组在模拟危机情景下对应急预案有效性的演练。战术决策也应被定期测试以确保可及时获得应急资金。Components of the BOCNY CFP will be regularly tested to ensure its readiness in the event of a liquidity crisis. This includes the convening of the Liquidity Crisis Management Team under a simulated crisis scenario to test the operational effectiveness of the CFP. Tactical countermeasures are also regularly tested to ensure readiness for the timely access of funds.

# 2. 适用范围Scope

纽约分行应急预案适用于中国银行纽约分行及其下属分支机构（以下统称为“纽约分行（BOCNY）”）。The BOCNY CFP is applicable to BOC New York Branch and its satellite branches (collectively “BOCNY”).

纽约分行流动性风险应急预案充分考虑了目前的资本结构、风险概况、复杂程度、业务经营活动、业务规模及风险偏好。This CFP is commensurate with the capital structure, risk profile, complexity, activities, size and established liquidity risk appetite for the entities listed above.

本流动性应急预案参照美联储针对在美资产超过500亿美元的大型银行控股公司及在美运营的外资银行，而发布的“美国强化审慎监管规则（EPS）”(12 CFR §252.156 项)监管文件中对外资银行流动性管理的相关要求制定。The regulatory guidance for CFP are specified in U.S. Federal Reserve Bank’s Rule on Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations, 12 CFR §252.156 Liquidity risk-management requirements for foreign banking organizations with combined U.S. assets of $50 billion, subsection (e) Contingency funding plan.

# 3. 职责与分工Roles and Responsibilities

## 3.1. 美国风险与管理委员会U.S. Risk & Management Committee

美国风险与管理委员会是中国银行董事会下设的子委员会，旨在监督管理纽约分行所产生的各类风险。按照美联储“美国强化审慎监管规则”的相关要求，美国风险与管理委员会履行美国风险委员会职责。The U.S. Risk & Management Committee is a subcommittee of the BOC Board of Directors that is responsible for overseeing all risks arising from BOCNY. The Committee fulfills the roles required of a U.S. Risk Committee as outlined in the Federal Reserve Board’s Enhanced Prudential Standards.

## 3.2. 纽约分行资产负债管理委员会New York Branch Asset and Liability Committee

纽约分行资产负债管理委员会（以下简称“资产负债管理委员会（ALCO））主要负责中国银行纽约分行的流动性、资金头寸、风险管理、结构性与交易市场风险以及投资组合管理等工作。The BOCNY Asset and Liability Committee (“ALCO”) is responsible for oversight of BOCNY’s liquidity and funding positions and risk management, structural and trading market risk, and investment portfolio management.

纽约分行资产负债管理委员会，职责与权限还包括：The BOCNY Asset and Liability Committee (“ALCO”) is the board level committee also accountable for:

* 审批纽约分行流动性应急预案，该项工作每年至少进行一次；以及，Approving the BOCNY CFP for the BOCNY at least annually, and;
* 如需要对应急预案进行重大修订，在其实施之前进行审批。Approving any material revisions to the BOCNY CFP for the BOCNY prior to the implementation of such revisions.

应急预案启动时，危机处理小组将通知资产负债管理委员会，并就相关事件进行咨询。危机处理小组负责在应急情景中向资产负债管理委员会汇报与更新状态。ALCO will be consulted and/or notified by the LCMT in the event that the CFP has been activated. Additional reporting and status updates will be made by LCMT to ALCO during a liquidity event.

## 3.3. 流动性危机处理小组Liquidity Crisis Management Team

流动性危机处理小组（以下简称 “危机处理小组”）在应急预案启动后召集，基于已确定的应急资金来源及应对措施，负责实施补救措施。在流动性危机时期，危机处理小组会定期召开会议。会议召开的频率视流动性风险事件的严重程度及压力情景发生时的具体情况而作相应调整。The Liquidity Crisis Management Team (“LCMT”) is convened on activation of the BOCNY CFP and is responsible for any remediation actions that are established based on identified contingent liquidity sources and countermeasures available during the liquidity event. The LCMT will meet regularly throughout the crisis period. Meeting frequency will be governed by the liquidity event severity and may vary during the liquidity event.

如有必要，危机处理小组将通知纽约分行的资产负债管理委员会。The LCMT will inform the BOCNY Asset & Liability Committee of developments as appropriate.

流动性危机处理小组成员包括：The composition of the LCMT is as follows:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liquidity Crisis Management Team for BOCNY | | | |
| Name | Department/Position | LCMT Position | Alternate |
| Mr. Chen Xu | President and CEO of BOC U.S.A. | Member | Ms. Tong Yu |
| Mr. Jinjun Peng | EVP | Member | Ms. Tong Yu |
| Mr. Yong Ma | Chief Risk Officer | Member | Mr. Charlie Peng |
| Mr. Raymond Qiao | EVP | Member | Ms. Ke Yang |
| Mr. Min Zhu | EVP | Member | Mr. Jun Li |
| Mr. Qian Peng | Head of BOCNY Treasury | Member & Coordinator | Mr. Peng Zhang |
| Mr. Xiaoyi Zhang | Acting Head of Global Markets Department | Member | Mr. Marshall Leeshue |

流动性危机处理小组委员及替补成员的联络方式请参见附件“应急联络信息”章节。Emergency contact information for the LCMT members and alternates is given in Appendix A, *Emergency Contact Information*.

在发生流动性危机时，危机处理小组的应急权限包括：During a liquidity event the LCMT will be provided with the following emergency delegations:

* 有权调整业务模式，减少新业务发起；以及，Authority to direct lines of business to reduce asset origination;
* 有权决定出售纽约分行各业务条线资产。Authority to sell assets belonging to lines of business; and
* 临时批准超出交易对手信用额度，以获取资金；Temporary approval to exceed counterparty credit limits in order to source funds.

## 3.4. 纽约分行首席风险官Chief Risk Officer

纽约分行首席风险官负责监控流动性及资金风险，确保纽约分行的风险敞口在风险偏好规定范围内，并对应急预案中所建立的战略、方法及程序进行独立审阅。The CRO provides oversight over liquidity and funding risk to ensure that BOCNY exposure profile is within the risk appetite. The CRO is also responsible for providing an independent review of the strategies, methodologies, and procedures established in the CFP.

## 3.5. 纽约分行司库和纽约分行金融市场部New York Branch Treasury and New York Branch Global Markets Department

纽约分行司库（以下简称“司库”）负责监控纽约分行的流动性及资金风险。司库员工向司库总经理汇报流动性潜在风险。The BOCNY Treasury (“TRY”) is responsible for monitoring liquidity and funding risks for BOCNY. TRY will escalate to the Head of TRY perceived liquidity concerns.

司库负责建议应急预案中规定的有关流动性来源的策略安排以及应对现金流出的管理措施，而纽约分行金融市场部（以下简称“金融市场部”）负责执行有关建议措施。TRY is also responsible for the recommendation of many of the tactical and strategic plans for contingent liquidity sources and cash outflow countermeasures outlined in the CFP while BOCNY Global Markets Department (“MKD”) is responsible for the execution of the recommended remediation actions of relevant products.

## 3.6. 纽约分行司库总经理 New York Branch Head of Treasury

纽约分行司库总经理（以下简称“司库总经理”）统筹管理纽约分行的相关司库业务，负责纽约分行流动性应急预案的日常管理工作，并在发生流动性危机情景时协调流动性危机处理小组的相关工作。The Head of BOCNY Treasury (“Head of TRY”) manages treasury related activities for BOCNY. The Head of TRY is responsible for the maintenance of the BOCNY CFP and coordinates the Liquidity Crisis Management Team in the event of a liquidity stress event.

纽约分行司库总经理职责与权限包括：The Head of TRY has been delegated to:

* 在无需获得纽约分行资产负债管理委员会批准的情况下，批准并更新对流动性应急预案的非重大修订，包括但不限于：Approving and updating non-material revisions to the BOCNY CFP without prior approval of the BOCNY Asset and Liability Committee (“ALCO”) , including but not limited to:
  + 对紧急联络信息的更新；Updating emergency contact information,
  + 对使用流动性应急资金的操作程序的更新；Updating operational procedures for access to contingent liquidity sources,
  + 对沟通底稿及讨论要点的更新；Updating communication scripts and talking points, and;
  + 校准预警指标（EWI）的预警线。Timely recalibration of trigger levels on Early Warning Indicators (“EWIs”).
* 协调启动纽约分行应急预案，召集流动性危机处理小组开展相关工作。Coordinating to activate the BOCNY CFP and convening the Liquidity Crisis Management Team.

# 4. 流动性风险事件管理Liquidity Event Management

## 4.1. 整体流动性应急预案的触发CFP Activation

根据流动性风险压力测试框架，中国银行纽约分行进行定量测算以评估通过紧急融资抵御现金流失的应急能力。同时，通过建立风险预警指标对潜在流动性风险事件进行认定。这两个框架（详细内容请参见第五章流动性压力测试及预警指标体系）规定了应急预案触发机制。根据触发条件的类型，采取的应急措施包括：Concern that BOCNY does not have access to enough contingent liquidity to withstand a run on the bank is quantitatively assessed through the liquidity stress test framework. The potential for an emerging liquidity event is identified in the early warning indicator framework. These two key frameworks (outlined in section 5, *Liquidity Stress Tests and Early Warning Indicators*) are used by management to assess the need to activate the CFP. Depending on the type of trigger the following actions will be taken:

* 当预警指标达到橙色或红色预警值时，司库总经理须与流动性危机处理小组、资产负债管理委员会、市场风险管理部、以及全面风险管理部共同商讨是否需要启动应急预案；For amber or red level trigger EWI events, the Head of TRY will consult with members of the LCMT, ALCO, MRD, and ERM about the need for CFP activation.

应急预案被启动后，所有紧急授权都立即生效，并立即向美国风险与管理委员会报告。On activation of the CFP, all emergency delegations provided by the CFP come into effect. The activation of BOCNY CFP delegations will be reported immediately to USRMC.

## 4.2. 流动性危机事件管理Liquidity Crisis Event Management

应急预案启动后，危机处理小组统筹相关工作，负责管理和监控流动性危机。危机处理小组协调人负责决定会议召开的频率，不排除突发紧急流动性危机时一天多次的情况。The LCMT is convened upon activation of the CFP and is responsible for actively managing and monitoring the liquidity crisis. The frequency of LCMT meetings will be proposed by the team coordinator and could be as often a multiple times each day at the onset of an acute liquidity crisis.

流动性危机处理小组的职责与权力包括：The LCMT is responsible for:

1. 评估纽约分行流动性状况；Assessing BOCNY’s liquidity situation;
2. 决定中国银行在处理危机情景的管理方向；Deciding on a management direction for BOC to deal with liquidity stress event;
3. 优化流动性补充的各种候选方案，决定所需采取的措施，包括对其有效性与及时性进行评估；Prioritizing available options to address BOC’s liquidity needs and make decisions on measures to be executed, including an assessment of effectiveness and timeliness;
4. 决定内部沟通内容，维护中国银行的声誉，支持业务部门的持续经营；Making decisions on internal communications to maintain the integrity and reputation of BOC and support the continuous operations of the business units;
5. 决定与外部监管、客户、公众等的沟通内容；Making decisions on external communications with the regulators, customers and other external parties; and
6. 对业务条线吸收存款与发放贷款的经营决策提供指导意见。Providing direction to deposit gathering and lending activities of the lines of business.

危机处理小组负责根据已确定的流动性资金来源及现金流失对策，从风险缓释与应急计划清单中挑选适合本次流动性危机的补救措施（具体内容请见第六章——*应急资金来源与现金流失对策*）。危机处理小组成员须确保实施的补救措施在其权限范围内。The LCMT is responsible for developing remediation plans based upon identified contingent liquidity sources and cash outflow countermeasures (see section 6, *Contingent Liquidity Sources and Cash Outflow Countermeasures)* for an extensive list of actions that are appropriate for the liquidity event. Each member of the LCMT is responsible for ensuring implementation of the remediation actions within their authority.

流动性危机处理小组提出补救措施时需要考虑以下几点内容：Key items for the LCMT to consider in remediation plans include:

* 实际与预期的流动性水平；Current and forecasted liquidity levels;
* 跨周期评估流动性缺口；Assessment of liquidity gap across relevant time horizons;
* 补救措施的有效性与可行性；以及Availability and viability of countermeasure actions; and
* 从市场操作或客户决策的角度考虑声誉风险。Reputational risk associated with market-based actions or client-based decisions.

与内外部利益相关方保持充足、有效的沟通是流动性危机管理计划中的关键要素。对重要利益相关方沟通的时机与责任由流动性风险事件的严重程度及特征所决定（更多内容请见第七章*沟通计划*）。在附件一*应急联络信息*中列示了重要利益相关方的紧急联络人信息。Adequate and effective communication to internal and external stakeholders is a critical element of a liquidity crisis management plan. The timing and responsibility of the communication to key stakeholders is determined by the severity and characteristics of the liquidity event (for further details refer to section 7, *Communication Plan*). The emergency contact information for key stakeholders is given in Appendix A, *Emergency Contact Information*.

启动应急预案后，危机处理小组定期向资产负债管理委员会汇报事件状态。The LCMT will report on status regularly to ALCO throughout the time the CFP is activated.

应急预案的终止机制与善后处理在第8.1章节纽约分行*流动性应急预案终止机制*中进行说明。Deactivation procedures for the CFP and post-event reporting requirements are outlined in section 8.1, *Deactivation of BOCNY CFP*.

# 5. 流动性压力测试与预警指标体系Liquidity Stress Tests and Early Warning Indicators

## 5.1. 流动性压力测试体系Liquidity Stress Testing Framework

全面的流动性压力测试体系是纽约分行流动性风险管理框架的重要组成部分。它被用来识别对纽约分行有显著影响的流动性压力事件。该体系采用定量的方式评估流动性压力情景下，对纽约分行风险状况水平的影响程度。A comprehensive liquidity stress test framework is a core element of the BOCNY liquidity risk management framework. It is used to identify liquidity stress events that could have a significant impact on the BOCNY. It quantitatively assesses the level and nature of the impact on the risk profile of the BOCNY that may occur during the identified liquidity stress events.

纽约分行司库负责流动性压力测试工作，至少每月进行一次。有关纽约分行流动性压力测试模型与假设的详细信息，可参见司库有关“流动性压力测试报告”。Liquidity stress tests are conducted at least monthly by BOCNY’s TRY. Details of the BOCNY liquidity stress test models and associated assumptions can be found in TRY’s “Liquidity Stress Test Documentation”.

流动性压力测试提供以下两项重要信息：The liquidity stress tests inform two critical elements:

1. 由无变现障碍、优质流动性资产组合组成的、由不同压力情景下净现金流出量决定的流动性缓冲的最小规模；以及The minimum buffer size of the unencumbered, high quality liquid asset portfolio is defined by the net cash outflow under the various crisis scenarios; and
2. 预警指标由压力情景模型的描述决定。The early warning indicators are determined from the narratives of the set of crisis situations that are modeled.

## 5.2. 预警指标体系Early Warning Indicator Framework

流动性压力测试共包含三种压力情景，分别是银行个体性危机、系统性危机及合并情景，这三种是监管的最低要求。系统性危机的两种类型包括：一、美国银行危机；二、由于中国经济增速减缓而导致的全球经济疲软。具体的流动性压力情景描述请见附件二*流动性压力测试情景*。Three liquidity stress scenarios are described and modeled. They include the regulatory minimum of an idiosyncratic name crisis, a systemic crisis and a combined scenario. Two types of systemic crises are modeled: (a) a U.S. banking crisis, and (b) a significant global economic downturn originating from a slowing of growth in the People’s Republic of China. These liquidity stress test scenario narratives are detailed in Appendix B, *Liquidity Stress Test Scenario Narratives*.

预警指标由司库总经理负责制定，旨在提示根据流动性压力测试定义的我行新增和在上升的流动性风险点。预警指标应与纽约分行的业务规模、业务复杂程度以及风险状况相适应。当预警指标出现下行趋势时，提醒机构管理人员应通过评估以及潜在应对措施以减少任何潜在风险暴露。Early warning indicators (“EWIs”) are established by the Head of TRY in order to alert BOC of the emergence of new or increasing vulnerabilities as defined by the liquidity stress test narratives. The EWIs are tailored to the size, complexity and risk profile of the BOCNY. Negative trends serve as leading indicators that warrant an assessment and potential response by management in order to mitigate exposure to any emerging risks.

## 5.2.1. 预警指标类型与水平Early Warning Indicator Types and Levels

预警指标及各指标对应的橙色预警和红色警告的临界值请见附件三*预警指标*。The EWIs and corresponding ‘amber’ and ‘red’ alert levels are detailed in Appendix C, *Early Warning Indicators*.


预警指标覆盖以下四大类型：EWIs correspond to the following four categories:


* 宏观经济与外部指标；Macroeconomic and external indicators;
* 中国银行个体性市场指标；BOC specific market indicators;
* 内部财务绩效指标；以及Internal financial performance indicators; and
* 内部流动性指标。Internal liquidity indicators.

指标设有橙色预警和红色警告的阈值。为确保指标阈值设定的合理性，需对预警指标阈值进行持续校准工作。阈值不应过紧以致不断触发预警，亦不应过松以致其无法有效提示预警。校准工作一般基于历史数据分析及管理人员判断完成。EWI has an amber (warning) and red (alert) threshold. Calibration of EWI trigger levels occurs on an on-going basis to ensure that they are appropriate. They are required not to be too finely tuned that they continuously get triggered, and not be too broad such that they do not effectively act as an early warning. This calibration is normally done via a historical analysis overlaid with management judgment.

## 5.2.2. 评估与汇报Assessment and Escalation

一旦预警指标报警，应对是否启动纽约分行应急预案进行评估（应急预案的启动请见第4.1章节*触发机制*）。下图为突破橙色预警和红色警告阈值后的相关管理及评估的工作流程。In the event an EWI is breached an assessment needs to be made on the need to activate the BOCNY CFP (as described in section 4.1, *CFP Activation*). The following flow charts describe the management assessment process for amber and red EWI triggers.





为了评估突破预警的风险事件的严重程度，纽约分行司库应考虑的因素包括但不限于以下内容：In order to assess the severity of trigger, the Head of TRY will consider a number of factors including but not limited to the following:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 考虑因素 | 原因 |
| 突破预警值的指标数量 | 突破数量越多，可能标示着更高的风险以及更严重的流动性危机。 |
| 突破预警值部分的量级 | 突破预警值部分的量级越大，可能标示着更高的风险以及/或更严重的流动性危机。 |
| 过去30天（或相关时期）突破预警值的频率以及持续时间 | 频率越高以及/或持续时间越久，可能标示着更高的风险以及更严重的流动性危机。 |
| 近期（或相关时期）关键预警指标趋势变化情况 | 关键预警指标出现下滑的趋势，可能标示着更高的风险以及更严重的流动性危机。 |
| 近期流动性/资金风险相关指标的风险水平 | 近期流动性/资金风险相关指标恶化，可能标示着更高的风险以及更严重的流动性危机。 |
| 近期流动性/资金风险相关指标波动情况 | 近期流动性/资金风险波动增大，可能标示着更高的风险以及更严重的流动性危机。 |
| 近期流动性/资金风险相关指标趋势变化情况 | 近期流动性/资金风险出现下滑的趋势，可能标示着更高的风险以及更严重的流动性危机 |
| 对突破预警值的各指标间相互影响及意义的分析 | 某些指标间存在关联性，可能会正相关也可能负相关。根据这些因素采取措施，可能有更为显著的影响。 |
| 内外部的新信息与相关信息可能影响中国银行资本结构、流动性、交易对手、客户乃至整个金融系统 | 与相关专家进行沟通，以提供有关突破预警指标的指导与解释。 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Factor Considered | Reasons for Consideration |
| Number of EWI triggers | A greater number of EWI triggers may indicate heightened risk of and greater severity in a liquidity crisis. |
| Magnitude of the EWI over its threshold | Larger breaches over EWI thresholds may indicate heightened risk and/or greater severity of a liquidity crisis |
| Frequency and duration of the breach for each triggered EWI within the past 30 days (or relevant timeframe) | More frequent breaches and/or extended duration of breaches over EWI thresholds may indicate heightened risk of and greater severity in a liquidity crisis. |
| Recent trends of significant EWIs (or relevant timeframe) | Negative trends in EWI indicators may indicate heightened risk of and greater severity of a liquidity crisis. |
| Recent level of firm liquidity/funding risk indicators | Deterioration of firm specific liquidity/funding indicators may indicate heightened risk and greater severity of a liquidity crisis. |
| Recent volatility of firm liquidity/funding risk indicators over | Increased volatility of liquidity/funding indicators may indicate heightened risk and greater severity of a liquidity crisis. |
| Recent trend of firm liquidity/funding risk indicators | Negative trends in liquidity/funding indicators may indicate heightened risk and greater severity of a liquidity crisis. |
| The significance and interplay of each triggered EWI and liquidity/funding measures | Some EWI triggers are correlated and will move in tandem or in opposition. Measures may have greater significance depending on these factors. |
| New and relevant information from internal and external sources that may affect BOC’s capital and liquidity profile, its counterparties and clients, or the overall financial system | Relevant experts are consulted to provide guidance and explanation regarding early warning indicator breaches. |

## 5.2.3. 监测与报告Monitoring and Reporting

司库对内部流动性指标的测算频率与纽约分行风险治理架构规定相同，其他预警指标由司库每日监测。Internal liquidity indicators are calculated in the same frequency by TRY as per the BOCNY Risk Governance Framework. Other EWI’s will be monitored daily by TRY.

应对所有突破警戒线的风险事件进行调查与报告。详细的预警指标事件终止责任请见第8.2章节*预警指标事件终止*。All trigger level events will be investigated and reported. Detailed EWI trigger event closure responsibilities are outlined in section 8.2, *EWI Trigger Event Closure*.

# 6. 应急资金来源与应对现金流出的措施Contingent Liquidity Sources and Cash Outflow Countermeasures

## 6.1. 流动性缓冲Liquidity Buffer

危机时，中国银行纽约分行主要应急资金来源包括：The primary source of contingent liquidity for BOCNY in the event of a crisis are:

1. 存放于美联储的现金；以及The cash balances held at the Federal Reserve, and;
2. 无变现障碍、优质流动性资产组合。A portfolio of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets.

资产组合的规模要求由流动性压力测试模型决定。若流动性缓冲不足以满足现金偿付要求，先使用四类优先级较高的资金来源，详细介绍请见第6.2章节“*优先级较高的应急资金来源*”，应急资金来源与现金流出应对措施，请见第6.3章节*应急资金来源与现金流出应对措施*。The required size of this portfolio is determined from the liquidity stress test model. In the event that this buffer is insufficient in order to meet cash outflow obligations, instructions for four high priority liquidity sources is given in section 6.2, *Detailed Instruction for High Priority Liquidity Sources,*  followed by an extensive list of contingent liquidity sources and cash outflow countermeasures in section 6.3, *Contingent Liquidity and Cash Outflow Countermeasures*.

## 6.2. 优先级较高的应急资金来源Detailed Instruction for High Priority Liquidity Sources

以下四种融资方式已确定为危机发生时优先使用的应急资金来源。因此在本应急预案报告中进行详细说明。The following four actions have been identified as likely leading sources of liquidity in the onset of a crisis event. As such more detailed instructions are provided directly in this BOCNY CFP.

## 6.2.1. 总行资金支持Contact Head Office for Support

流动性危机发生后，应及时报告总行资产负债管理部。尽管流动性压力测试的假设是在最初的30个日历日总行不提供资金支持，但如果总行有能力则将努力确保纽约分行的运营。On the onset of a liquidity crisis, Head Office Asset and Liability Management Department would be immediately notified. Although the liquidity stress tests assume no Head Office support for an initial period of 30 calendar days, if the Head Office is able to it will endeavor to ensure the survival of the BOCNY entities.

具体流程：Specific procedures are:

1. 由司库联系总行资产负债管理部。总行联系人请详见附件一。

TRY will contact Head Office Asset and Liability Management Department. The contact person is listed in Appendix A.

1. 由司库联系总行财管部。总行联系人请详见附件一。

TRY will contact Head Office Financial Management Department. The contact person is listed in Appendix A.

## 6.2.2. 证券回购Repo of securities

纽约分行可使用其自有无变现障碍证券叙作回购交易。总行允许纽约分行使用其托管在纽约分行的部分债券叙做回购交易。BOCNY may enter into repurchase agreements using BOCNY’s unencumbered investment securities. The Head Office will also allow BOCNY to repo certain Head Office-owned securities held in custody at BOCNY.

具体流程如下：Specific procedures are:

1. 出现现金流缺口时，司库将建议利用其他货币市场工具以减少或消除缺口, 并通知金融市场部执行；

If there is a cash shortfall，TRY will recommend money market transactions to reduce or eliminate the shortfall and inform MKD to execute;

1. 如果在采取以上措施后缺口仍然存在，司库则通知金融市场部执行回购交易；If the shortfall remains，TRY will inform MKD to conduct repo transactions;
2. 识别并计量可使用的无变现障碍资产的规模（包括总行与纽约分行证券）；Identify and calculate the value of the unencumbered securities available (Head Office and NYB securities);
3. 金融市场部只可与总行授权批准的交易对手进行回购交易；MKD may only transact with Head Office approved repo dealers;
4. 回购交易前，金融市场部需要计算对回购交易对手的可使用的信用额度。金融市场部应尽最大努力确保不超过交易对手限额，并通知司库限额；MKD should calculate credit limit before transacting with repo dealer and make best efforts to not breach counterparty credit limits and inform TRY the limits information;
5. 资金中台部将交易录入系统；Treasury Middle Office Department (MOD) enters transactions in applicable systems for processing;
6. 在完成回购交易后，金融市场部应对回购交易的结算状态进行监测并通知司库，司库查询美联储账户余额以确认结算的现金流入；after the repo transactions, MKD will monitor the repo settlement status and inform TRY while TRY will inquire the Fed Reserve balance amount to confirm the cash inflow from settlement;
7. 若使用总行持有的证券进行回购，金融市场部应将所有交易明细信息通知司库，司库汇报至总行资产负债管理部。If Head Office securities were used, MKD will update TRY with all transaction details and TRY will confirm with Head Office Asset and Liability Management Department.

## 6.2.3. 出售投资资产Sale of investment portfolio

作为产生资金的选择之一，可以考虑出售纽约分行的部分投资资产。Of the options for generating funds, certain parts of the BOCNY investment portfolio could be identified for sale.

具体流程如下：Specific procedures are:

1. 启动应急预案后，为缓解现金流缺口，将考虑出售投资资产；After CFP is engaged, the decision to sell investment securities will be considered to make up the liquidity shortfall;
2. 在适当的情况下，司库向危机处理小组提出关于出售投资资产的提议；TRY will recommend to LCMT the securities sales proposal if appropriate;
3. 危机处理小组负责批准关于出售投资资产的提议；LMCT will need to approve strategic securities sales proposal;
4. 危机处理小组负责对投资组合进行分析并选定将被出售的证券及目标金额；LMCT will analyze the investment portfolio and identify securities and determine a targeted amount;
5. 危机处理小组委托金融市场部执行市场操作。LMCT will delegate the execution to MKD.

## 6.2.4.出售贷款Sale of loan portfolio

作为长期产生资金的选择之一，可以考虑出售纽约分行的部分贷款。Of the longer term options for generating funds, certain parts of the BOCNY loan portfolio could be identified for sale.

具体流程：Specific procedures are:

1. 启动应急预案后，为缓解现金流缺口，将考虑出售贷款；After CFP is engaged, the decision to sell loans will be considered to make up the liquidity shortfall;
2. 在适当的情况下，司库向危机处理小组提出关于出售贷款的提议；TRY will recommend to LCMT the loan sales proposal if appropriate;
3. 危机处理小组负责批准关于出售贷款的提议；LMCT will need to approve strategic loan sales proposal;
4. 危机处理小组负责对贷款组合进行分析并选定将被出售的贷款及目标金额；LMCT will analyze the loan portfolio and identify loans and determine a targeted amount;
5. 危机处理小组委托贷款发放部门或分行执行出售操作。LMCT will delegate the execution to applicable loan departments/branch.

## 6.2.5. 其它程序Other Procedures

美联储贴现窗口借款和美联储日内流动性透支额度有单独的操作流程文件。There are separate procedure documents for accessing the Fed Discount Window and usage of Net Debit Cap.

## 6.3. 应急资金与现金流出的应对措施Contingent Liquidity and Cash Outflow Countermeasures

下图清单是增加未来现金流入或减少未来资金需求的相关措施。措施执行按优先顺序排列，同时对不同流动性压力情景下的措施可用性进行描述（例如，银行个体性危机/系统性危机）。措施执行的时间范围分为以下两类：The following is a list of actions to either bring in contingent liquidity or countermeasures to reduce future funding needs. The actions are listed in priority along with a description of the likely availability under various liquidity stress scenarios (e.g. idiosyncratic/systemic). The timeframe in which they can be executed is given under the following categorization:

* 策略性：可在短期内实施的且不要求中国银行纽约分行对现有经营模式进行实质性调整的措施。Tactical: Actions that generally can be implemented within relatively short timeframes without requiring material changes to the BOCNY business model.
* 战略性：可应对长期流动性压力、可能要求中国银行纽约分行对现有经营模式进行实质性调整的、且可能对利润造成负面影响的措施。措施的实施需要额外的时间，一般在长期持续压力的情况下采取。Strategic: Actions to withstand persistent stress, which may require changes to the BOCNY business model and may have material negative impacts to profit & loss. These actions require additional time to implement and would be undertaken for longer term disruptions.

| 应急资金来源及融资措施 | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 优先级 | 资金来源/融资措施 | 说明 | 适用的压力情景 | 类型 |
| 高 | 获得总行支持 | * 纽约分行向总行请求资金调拨，作为流动性缓冲资金 | * 由于中国持续增加的经济压力，在危机情景下，假设附属机构的现金余额将大幅流失 * 由于对资金安全及稳健性的担忧，纽约分行的美国监管机构中止其他附属机构间的资金往来 * 基于审慎性原则，压力测试方案中不考虑在前30天内从总行获得资金支持，但这仍然是危机发生时首先采取的措施 | 策略性调整 |
| 高 | 证券回购 | * 纽约分行使用其自有的流动性证券进行回购交易 * 总行允许纽约分行使用总行持有并托管纽约分行的有价证券进行隔夜回购交易 | * 现阶段，纽约分行自有的可用于回购交易的流动性证券规模较小 | 策略性调整 |
| 高 | 提高批发市场融资金额（包括银行间市场、YCD和BCD等大额存单） | 经纪商大额存单：   * 向美国的证券经纪商的零售客户出售大额存单 * 一般由FDIC承保且持有至到期 * 仅当纽约分行持续满足FDIC关于外国银行纽约分行“资本充裕”定义时，方可使用   扬基定期存单：   * 向机构投资者出售大额存单，出售对象多为货币基金 * 投资者多为风险厌恶型的，对评级下调及负面新闻很敏感   第三方金融机构存款：   * 中国金融机构存放在我纽约分行的用于美元清算的款项 * 中资银行中，纽约分行是最大的美元清算服务提供机构   企业存款：   * 包括那些寻求在中国建立合作伙伴关系的美国企业客户的活期及定期存款   证券经纪商存款   * 从美国证券公司的零售客户账户转出的闲置资金以及用于支付的款项 * 存款余额一般不超过FDIC承保上限 * 仅当纽约分行持续满足FDIC关于外国银行纽约分行“资本充裕”定义时，方可使用 | 经纪商大额存单：   * 假设在危机中依赖发行经纪商大额存单增加资金供给不可行   扬基定期存单：   * 由于投资者对压力情景的敏感性，由扬基定期存单募集的资金在压力情景下将快速流失   第三方金融机构存款：   * 假设第三方金融机构客户对于个体性和综合情景中的压力相对敏感，压力下会撤出资金 * 假定相关客户即使不存在多重美元结算关系，但为了其自身能正常完成交易活动，仍然保留一定的资金余额   企业存款：   * 假设企业客户的运营性质存款（如营运资本）相对稳定 * 假设个体性和综合压力情景中非运营性质的额外存款将流失   证券公司存款   * 根据Reg D要求，经纪商需保持存款余额在一定水平上，因此认为这类存款相对稳定。假设这类存款在危机中到期不续作。 | 策略性调整 |
| 高 | 金融市场部暂停定期拆放 | * 暂停定期拆放业务将改善中国银行纽约分行的流动性现状 | * 适用于所有压力情景，但可能将对声誉产生影响 | 策略性调整 |
| 高 | 调整或卖出投资组合增加流动性 | * 中国银行纽约分行持有的证券投资组合主要由金融机构发行的投资级别的证券组成 * 其中大部分证券受到资产抵押监管要求的限制，无法进行出售或抵押 | * 投资组合中大部分证券受到资产抵押监管要求的限制 | 策略性调整 |
| 中 | 贷款部门暂停贷款发放 | * 纽约分行目前的贷款组合包括银团贷款、定期贷款、抵押贷款及贸易融资贷款 * 可暂停这些贷款的发放以缓解中国银行纽约分行现阶段的流动性 | * 适用于所有压力情景，但会对银行品牌会产生持续性的负面影响 | 战略性调整 |
| 中 | 从美联储贴现窗口借款 | * 以证券抵押的方式从美联储纽约分行进行担保借款 * 仅在所有可能的资金来源都被合理地使用后，中国银行才会向美联储贴现窗口寻求借款 | * 在正常压力情景下，中国银行纽约分行可以通过美联储拆借资金，将其作为最后的融资来源 * 由于缺少合格优质的流动性证券用于抵押，纽约分行可能不能从贴现窗口获得资金 | 战略性调整 |
| 中 | 暂停新的合约承诺 | * 纽约分行暂停发放新的合约承诺以缓解流动性压力 | * 适用于所有压力情景，但可能将对声誉产生影响 | 战略性调整 |
| 低 | 出售贷款组合 | * 纽约分行目前的贷款组合包括银团贷款、定期贷款、抵押贷款及贸易融资贷款 * 这些贷款可被变现以产生额外的流动性 | * 危机发生时，中国银行纽约分行尝试出售贷款并达成贷款出售协议，假设受到压力情景的影响，中国银行纽约分行无法在30天内完成任何贷款出售并取得收益入帐 | 战略性调整 |

| Contingent Liquidity Sources and Funding Countermeasures | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Action Priority | Funding Source/ Countermeasure | Description | Availability in Stress Event Scenario | Action Type |
| High | Request assistance from HO | * BOCNY calls on Head Office (“HO”) to transfer United States Dollars (USD) placed by HO to use as a liquidity buffer | * Affiliate cash balances are assumed to run-off significantly during the crisis due to assumed ongoing stress in China * BOCNY’s U.S. regulators are assumed to halt the outflow of additional affiliate cash due to safety and soundness concerns * Although stress tests conservatively do not count HO support for 30 days, this still the first action to be taken. | Tactical |
| High | Execute repo transactions | * BOCNY may enter into repurchase agreements using BOCNY’s unencumbered investment securities * The Head Office allows BOCNY to repo certain Head Office -owned securities held in custody at BOCNY on an overnight basis | * Currently BOCNY does not own a significant balance of unencumbered securities available for use in repo transactions | Tactical |
| High | Increase borrowing in wholesale markets (including interbank, YCD, and BCD) | Brokered CDs:   * CDs sold primarily to retail customers of broker-dealers in the U.S. * Generally FDIC-insured and held until maturity * Only available provided that BOCNY continues to meet the FDIC’s “well capitalized” definition for an insured branch of a foreign bank   Yankee CDs   * CDs sold to institutional investors that are typically money funds * Investors are generally risk averse and sensitive to ratings downgrades and negative headlines   Third Party Financial Institution Deposits   * USD placed at BOCNY by financial institutions based in China to which BOCNY provides USD clearing * BOCNY is the largest provider of USD clearing services among the Chinese banks   Corporate Deposits   * Includes both demand and time deposits from U.S. corporate customers seeking to establish relationships in China   Brokered Sweep Deposits   * Funds swept from the accounts of retail customers of broker-dealers in the U.S. and payable on demand * Deposit balances are generally within the FDIC insurance limit * Only available provided that BOCNY continues to meet the FDIC’s “well capitalized” definition for an insured branch of a foreign bank | Brokered CDs:   * Incremental brokered CD funding is not assumed to be available during a crisis.   Yankee CDs   * Due to the sensitivity of the investors to the stress conditions, Yankee CD funding is assumed to run-off quickly under the crisis scenarios   Third Party Financial Institution Deposits   * Third-party financial institution clients are assumed to be relatively sensitive to the stresses in the idiosyncratic and combined scenarios, and withdraw cash to the extent possible * It is assumed that there would be some balances remaining as customers without multiple USD clearing relationships may need to retain some balances at BOCNY for transactional purposes   Corporate Deposits   * Operational deposits (i.e. working capital) from corporate customers are assumed to be relatively stable. * Non-operational excess is assumed to run off in the idiosyncratic and combined scenarios.   Brokered Sweep Deposits   * According to Reg D brokers need to maintain a certain level of deposits of these types of deposits leading to relatively stable behavior. It is assumed they are not rolled on maturity under times of stress. | Tactical |
| High | MKD suspends term lending | * Term lending could be suspended bolster BOCNY’s existing liquidity position | * Available in all scenarios but has the potential to cause reputation damage. | Tactical |
| High | Rebalance and Sale of investment portfolio to increase liquidity | * BOCNY maintains a securities portfolio comprised mainly of investment grade securities issued by financial institutions * The vast majority of these securities are currently encumbered to meet certain regulatory asset pledge requirements and are not available to be sold or pledged in secured funding transactions | * The majority of the investment portfolio is currently encumbered for regulatory asset pledge requirements | Tactical |
| Medium | Loan departments suspend lending | * BOCNY maintains a loan portfolio comprised of syndications, time loans, mortgages, and trade finance loans * These loans could be suspended to bolster BOCNY’s existing liquidity position | * Available in all scenarios. Need to be conscious of on-going brand damage from such actions. | Strategic |
| Medium | Borrow from Fed Discount Window | * Secured borrowing from the FRBNY utilizing securities pledged at the FRBNY account * BOC is to utilize Discount Window funding only after all other funding sources have been reasonably explored | * Under normal stressed situation, BOC NY will be able to access funding through Fed Discount Window as the last resort of funding. * BOCNY is assumed to be unable to obtain Discount Window funding due to a lack of access to eligible unencumbered securities that can be pledged | Strategic |
| Medium | Suspend new commitment | * New contractual products from FLUs will be suspended to mitigate BOCNY’s liquidity pressure | * Available in all scenarios but has the potential to cause reputation damage | Strategic |
| Low | Sale of loan portfolio | * BOCNY maintains a loan portfolio comprised of syndications, time loans, mortgages, and trade finance loans * These loans could be liquidated to generate additional liquidity | * While BOCNY attempts to sell loans and makes initial arrangements to liquidate loan portfolios during the crisis, it is assumed that due to the nature of the stress conditions, BOCNY is not able to fully execute any loan sales and realize the proceeds from such sales within the 30-day time horizon | Strategic |

# 7. 沟通计划Communication Plan

危机发生时，需要确保清晰的沟通机制以向员工、总行、客户、市场参与者及监管机构提供及时、有意义的信息。危机处理小组负责管理沟通计划，确保提供相关信息并应对内外部的传言。同时决定是否需要主动公开信息或有选择性地针对个别询问进行必要反馈。In a crisis situation the flow of clear and meaningful communications is needed to provide timely information (as well as assurance) to employees, Head Office, customers, market participants and regulators. The LCMT will manage all communication plans in order to provide relevant information and address rumors from internal or external sources. The LCMT will determine whether the situation calls for active dissemination of information or selective responses to specific inquiries on a case-by-case basis.

“应急联络信息”（请见附件一*应急联络信息*）清单包含在危机时，作为紧急联络人且可带领其所在业务条线应对流动性危机的中国银行员工的联系方式。同时，一并提供的还包括总行的相关联系方式。The emergency contact information (in Appendix A, *Emergency Contact Information*) provides a list of BOC staff that will act as the emergency contact person and lead their business lines for actions in the liquidity event. Additionally it lists contact information for Head Office.

以下沟通行动将于启动纽约分行的应急预案后，在危机处理小组指导下执行：At the direction of the LCMT, the following communication activities will generally occur in the event of BOCNY CFP activation:

1. 司库总经理与总行保持联系并汇报更新流动性危机的最新情况;Head of TRY will contact Head Office and update them on the liquidity crisis situation;
2. 中国银行美国的首席执行官以及/或纽约分行首席风险官将向美国风险与管理委员会汇报并更新流动性危机的最新情况；The President and CEO of BOC U.S.A. and/or CRO will contact members of the U.S. Risk & Management Committe and update them on the liquidity crisis situation;
3. 纽约分行及下属分行的行长联系其存款大户向其提供拟定好的重要信息；U.S. Branch Managers shall contact their largest depositors and communicate key message to clients based on the set;
4. 中国银行通过网站及媒体向社会公布相关信息，所有媒体的提问应由纽约分行指定人选回答；以及BOC will post relevant Q&A and responses to online channels and media coverage. All media inquiry shall be directed to the single point person within BOCNY; and
5. 向所有可能与客户、储户及其他除媒体外的外部各方联系的员工公布沟通备忘录。Talking points will be distributed to all employees that may come in contact with customers, depositors or other external parties other than the media.

具体针对发生危机后的沟通流程参照附件四。每年度的应急预案危机模拟演练（第9.2章节）应包括对该流程的测试。Further communication process refer to Appendix D. The annul CFP crisis simulation (Section 9.2) shall include the flow testing.

# 8. 纽约分行应急预案的终止机制与预警解除Deactivation of BOCNY CFP and EWI Trigger Event Closure

## 8.1. 纽约分行应急预案的终止机制Deactivation of BOCNY CFP

一旦纽约分行的应急预案被启动，危机处理小组制定合适的应急措施，纽约分行执行。当危机处理小组确定应急预案下的授权不再必要，流动性事件结束。In the event that the BOCNY CFP has been activated, the appropriate remediation plan determined by the LCMT will be carried out by the BOCNY. The liquidity event will be considered over when the LCMT has determined the emergency delegations of the CFP are no longer needed.

终止纽约分行应急预案的条件包括：Conditions which would typically be required to deactivate the BOCNY CFP event would include:

* 预警指标不再超过橙色预警或红色警告的阈值；EWIs that are no longer at amber or red levels;
* 对纽约分行应急预案的终止通知应立即告知资产负债管理委员会和美国风险与管理委员会成员；以及Notification of the deactivation of BOCNY CFP delegations must be made immediately to ALCO and USRMC members; and
* 对应急预案的启动、所采取的行动、终止请求及流动性事件结束后的评估与总结，应向资产负债管理委员会汇报。A report of activation, actions taken and deactivation of the CFP along with a post liquidity event analysis will be presented to ALCO.

## 8.2. 预警解除EWI Trigger Event Closure

与纽约分行应急预案的启动不同，作为银行日常经营的一部分，在一段时间内可能会有一系列预警指标被突破。突破预警指标机制后，应进行进一步分析，从而为管理层的讨论与行动做好基础。这些行动可能会也可能不会启动纽约分行的应急预案。对预警指标突破事件的分析与行动需要有正式文档记录。当一项突破预警指标的风险事件返回至绿色区域（正常水平）时，预警解除。Unlike the BOCNY CFP activation, it is expected as part of business-as-usual to have a number of EWI trigger events occur over time. EWI triggers are mechanisms to initiate further analysis for management discussion and actions. Such action may or may not activate the BOCNY CFP. All EWI trigger event analysis and actions need to be formally documented at the closure of a trigger event. An EWI trigger event is deemed closed when it returns to a stable green status.

在预警事件解除时：At the closure of a EWI trigger event:

* 突破橙色预警的风险事件应被调查、记录并向纽约分行首席风险官及司库总经理汇报；以及Amber level EWI trigger events will be investigated, documented and reported to the CRO and Head of TRY; and
* 突破红色警告的风险事件应被调查、记录并向资产负债管理委员会汇报。Red level EWI trigger events will be investigated, documented and reported to ALCO.

资产负债管理委员会委员应收到一份全年所有突破预警指标的风险事件的摘要，确保风险控制得当。Members of ALCO should receive a summary of the trigger event occurrences on an annual basis to ensure the effectiveness of this risk control.

# 9. 纽约分行应急预案的演练Operational Testing of BOCNY CFP

## 9.1. 融资来源的演练Testing of Funding Access

司库将定期通知相关负责部门对各种融资来源进行测试。测试用于验证重要假设，如出售或回购特定资产，或其他获取应急资金的手段。测试同时还用于确保金融市场部操作人员熟悉获取资金的操作流程，在短时间内执行应急预案所须的法律以及操作手册就位。TRY will inform relevant responsible departments to test the access to various funding sources on a regular basis. This operational testing is used to verify key assumptions, such as the ability to sell or repo certain assets or access other contingent funding measures. The testing is also used to ensure that MKD’s operational procedures to access funding is clearly understood by its appropriate staff and necessary legal and operational documentation is in place to execute the CFP at short notice.

测试方法分为两种：There are two methods in which such tests can be conducted:

1. 实际执行： 例如出售或回购一笔资产、从美联储贴现窗口借入资金等等；或 Actual monetization/execution, e.g. the sale or repo of an asset, borrowing from the Federal Reserve Discount Window etc.; or
2. 桌面程序演练：演练为了实行市场操作所需要的每一步骤。Desktop procedural exercise, i.e. Performing every step up to actually executing in the market.

每次测试后，相关负责部门告知司库测试信息，司库应予记录并向司库总经理汇报。如测试不理想，结果将上报资产负债管理委员会委员。由委员会进行评估，该种融资方式是否需要更新或取消。演练的全面性（将哪些资产类别变现，需要多长时间）应与分行流动性缓冲资金及应急资金来源的规模与复杂性相适应。Relevant responsible departments will update TRY on all testing information and results. TRY should document and report all the testing to the Head of TRY after each test was conducted. If the test result was deemed unsatisfactory, a special report will be sent to ALCO to assess whether it is necessary to adjust or remove the funding sources from the CFP. The comprehensiveness of the testing suite (what asset classes to monetize, how much time is needed) should to be appropriate to the size and complexity of the branch’s buffer of liquid assets and assumed contingent funding sources.

## 9.2. 危机模拟Crisis Simulation

司库应该在向首席风险官咨询的基础上，组织年度流动性压力事件模拟工作。桌面程序模拟将包括启动应急预案并召集危机处理小组。该危机模拟用于评估纽约分行应急预案的有效性及可操作性。TRY, in consultation with the CRO, shall conduct an annual simulation of a liquidity stress event. The desktop simulation will activate the BOCNY CFP and convene the LCMT. This crisis simulation is used to assess the effectiveness and operational feasibility of the BOCNY CFP.

模拟测试的关键点，包括：Key aspects of the testing include:

* 确保职责职能恰当并被正确理解；Ensuring roles and responsibilities are appropriate and understood;
* 确认是否为最新的联系方式；Confirming contact information is up to date;
* 对应急资金可用性的重要假设进行测试；以及Test key assumptions of the availability of contingent funding; and
* 练习向所有利益相关方发布合适的沟通要点。Practice generating appropriate communication scripts to manage all stakeholders.

模拟测试应被审阅并向资产负债管理委员会委员汇报。纽约分行应急预案以及其他操作流程应被持续完善，重大修订由资产负债管理委员会批准。A review of the simulation will be conducted and reported to members of ALCO. Improvements to the BOCNY CFP and other operational procedures will be made as appropriate, with material changes to the BOCNY CFP escalated for approval by ALCO.

# 附件一：应急联络信息Appendix A: Emergency Contact Information

## A-1. 流动性危机处理小组联系方式Liquidity Crisis Management Team

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Title** | **Email** | **Phone** |
| Mr. Chen Xu | President and CEO of BOC U.S.A. | CXU@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 3081 |
| Mr. Jinjun Peng | EVP | JINJUNPENG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 3131 |
| Mr. Yong Ma | Chief Risk Officer | YONGMA@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 3105 |
| Mr. Raymond Qiao | EVP | LQIAO@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 3126 |
| Mr. Min Zhu | EVP | MINZHU@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 3221 |
| Mr. Qian Peng | Head of BOCNY Treasury | QPENG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-212 308 5342 |
| Mr. Xiaoyi Zhang | Acting Head of BOCNY Global Markets Department | XIAOYIZHANG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 3212 |
| Ms. Tong Yu | Alternate for Mr. Xu, and Mr. Peng | TONGYU@BOCUSA.COM | 001-212 308 5331 |
| Ms. Shurui Li | Alternate for Mr. Ma | SHURUILI@BOCUSA.COM | 001-212 308 5249 |
| Ms. Ke Yang | Alternate for Mr. Qiao | KYANG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-212 308 5364 |
| Mr. Jun Li | Alternate for Mr. Zhu | LIJUN@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 968 5878 |
| Mr. Peng Zhang | Alternate for Mr. Peng | PZHANG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-917 769 6529 |

## A-2. 中国银行总行主要部门联系方式Key BOC Head Office Contacts

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Title** | **Lotus Notes** | **Phone** |
| Ms. Ying Luo | Deputy General Manager of Financial Management Department | 罗颖/财务管理部/总行/BOC | +8610 66593323 |
| Mr. Xiaolong Li | Experienced Manager, Financial Management Department | 李小龙/财务管理部/总行/BOC | +8610 66593969 |
| Ms. Yanping Zhu | Senior Manager of Asset Liability management team, Financial Management Department | 朱雁萍/资产负债/财务管理部/总行/BOC | +8610 66593956 |
| Ms. Xiaokun Li | Experienced Manager, Asset and Liability Management Department | 栗晓鹍/资产负债管理部/总行/BOC | +8610 66593965 |
| Mr. Shuguang Liu | Senior Manager of Liquidity Management Team, Asset and Liability Management Department | 刘曙光/流动性/资产负债管理部/总行/BOC | +8610 66593985 |

## A-3. 纽约分行司库主要联络人Key BOCNY Treasury Contacts

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Title** | **Email** | **Phone** |
| Mr. Qian Peng | Head of TRY | QPENG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-212 308 5342 |
| Mr. Peng Zhang | VP | PZHANG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-917 769 6529 |

## A-4. 纽约分行业务条线负责人联系方式BOCNY Business Line Contacts

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Title** | **Email** | **Phone** |
| Ms. Ke Yang | Head of CBD | KYANG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-212 308 5364 |
| Ms. Yun Xia | Acting Head of TSD | YUNXIA@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 5741 |
| Ms. Wan Li | Head of CBC | LIWAN@BOCUSA.COM | 001-212 293 3897 |
| Ms. Ling Liu | Head of FID | LINGLIU@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 968 5178 |
| Mr. Yuechao Zheng | Head of CLD | YZHENG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 3171 |
| Mr. Jianzhong Xu | Head of BKD | JZXU@BOCUSA.COM | 001-646 231 3089 |
| Mr. Zhidan Liu | Head of CHB | ZDLIU@BOCUSA.COM | 001-312 506 8688 (Ext. 6718) |
| Mr. Ou Yong | Head of LAB | YONGOU@BOCUSA.COM | 001-213 688-8700 (Ext. 3837) |
| Mr. Wei Liang | Head of QNB | WLIANG@BOCUSA.COM | 001-212 308 5411 |

## A-5. 纽约分行沟通协调工作组联系方式BOCNY Communication Team Contacts

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Title** | **Email** | **Office Phone** |
| Mr. Peter Reisman | Managing Director | [PREISMAN@BOCUSA.COM](mailto:PREISMAN@BOCUSA.COM) | 001-646 231 5323 |
| Ms. Yuhui Feng | SVP of EO | [YUFENG@BOCUSA.COM](mailto:YUFENG@BOCUSA.COM) | 001-646 231 5305 |

# 附件二：流动性压力测试情景Appendix B: Liquidity Stress Test Scenario Narratives

## B-1. 个体性压力情景Idiosyncratic Stress Test Scenario Description

中国银行由于自身业务经营受创而遭受的压力事件；危机情景可能是由于单一或一系列事件组成，包括欺诈、交易损失、大客户违约或发生公众丑闻。该情景假定会对包括美国运营在内的中国银行全球经营产生影响。BOC is assumed to experience an idiosyncratic stress event precipitated by unease over the immediate viability of its businesses; these anxieties may have been precipitated by a single or combination of events, including fraud, trading losses, a large customer default, or a link to a public scandal. The scenario is assumed to impact BOC globally, including U.S. operations.

作为这些个体性事件的结果，中国银行的长期信用评级被下调三档，但同业银行仍保持其原有评级。因此，市场对中国银行的偿付债务能力的预期开始动摇，鉴于存在潜在的破产可能性，交易对手开始重新评估对中国银行的存/拆放资金风险及已存/拆放部分的风险。由于客户将业务转移到其他银行需一定时间，因此运营性质存款还将持续保留一段时间，但主要存款将迅速流失。此外，中国银行将不再能够获得批发市场的无担保资金，企业客户、投资者和第三方金融机构将根据其风险敏感性重新评估在危机下对中国银行的存/拆放资金行为。在集团范围的个体性危机中，中国银行美国分行及附属机构将无法从总行和其他非美国分行处获得资金支持。As a result of these events, BOC’s long-term debt rating is downgraded 3 notches, while peer banks retain their current ratings. Consequently, the market perception of BOC’s ability to meet its liabilities falters, and counterparties reevaluate the risk of placing funds with BOC as well as the risk of maintaining funds with BOC, given the perceived potential for insolvency. It is assumed that the majority of deposit funding runs off rapidly, although operational deposits are retained for a period of time while clients establish services at peer banks. In addition, wholesale unsecured funding is unavailable to BOC, as corporate clients, investors, and third-party financial institutions will view the placement of funds at BOC as a liability due to their sensitivity to the stress scenario at BOC. BOC U.S. branches and affiliates are unable to obtain support from Head Office and non-U.S. branches due to enterprise-wide stress conditions.

截至2019年六月，穆迪、标准普尔及惠誉分别对中国银行长期信用评级为A1、A和A。该情景针对长期信用评级下调三档而引起的流动性风险。穆迪、标准普尔或惠誉分别宣布下调中国银行信用评级。假设中国银行的长期信用评级分别为Baa1，BBB和BBB。As of June 2019, BOC’s long-term debt is rated A1, A, and A by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, respectively. This scenario defines the liquidity risk associated with a 3 notch long-term credit rating downgrade. Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s or Fitch announces that BOC credit ratings are downgraded. It is assumed the new ratings for BOC’s long-term debt will be Baa1, BBB, and BBB respectively.

信用评级下调通常被认为是一个滞后指标，而对金融机构的影响一般在评级宣布下调前就已经显现。因此，中国银行应积极监控并管理财务业绩状况/内部流动性指标（如存款流失、内部流动性压力测试结果等），以前瞻性地便制定行动方案来降低危机事件造成的影响。Credit rating downgrades are usually considered a lagging indicator, and therefore the effects on a financial institution are often seen before a downgrade is publically announced. Consequently, BOC should be cognizant of monitoring and managing financial performance/internal liquidity indicators (decrease in deposit levels, internal liquidity stress test results, etc.) proactively so as to have action plans in place to mitigate the stress event’s circumstances.

## B-2. 系统性压力情景Systemic Stress Test Scenario Description

系统性压力情景与2008年金融危机的情景相似，例如某主要行业的泡沫破裂导致证券价格大幅下跌，并对全球金融机构造成毁灭性打击。作为这些系统性压力冲击的结果，投资界对银行系统失去信心，金融机构的债务发行没有市场需求，并最终导致市场流动性的崩溃。对正常的流动性证券的市场需求大幅下降，只有拥有最高评级和市场深度支持的证券可以出售或以不高于正常情况的折价率进行融资。然而，多数以资产抵押进行融资的行为将面临资金价格出现显著提升。无担保资金市场连续六个月无法提供资金。此外，相关的信用危机将导致银行间货币市场资金的萎缩，以及流动性承诺额度支取的急剧提升。The systemic scenario assumes events similar to the 2008 banking crisis; i.e., the bursting of a major industry bubble that causes the values of securities to plummet, damaging financial institutions globally. As a result, the investor community has lost confidence in the banking system and there is no demand for debt issued from financial institutions, causing a collapse in market liquidity. The appetite for normally liquid securities falls sharply and only the most highly-rated, market-supported securities can be sold or funded without higher than normal haircuts. Conversely, most asset-based funding will experience significantly increased haircuts. Unsecured funding markets are non-existent for a period of six months. Moreover, the associated credit crisis would result in the shrinking of interbank money market funds and a sharp increase in drawdowns on committed liquidity lines.

系统性压力情景导致中国银行那些面临信用压力的存款客户缓慢抽离资金。假设美国分行的贷款叙作将在更严格的授信标准下进行，但零售存款在危机中相对稳定。总行监测发生在美国的风险事件，因危机尚未传染至国内，假设总行可对美国分行提供资金支持。在第30天的时候，美国的宏观经济情况进一步恶化，随之蔓延至中国。A systemic crisis precipitates a mild deposit runoff from BOC’s credit-stressed depositors. U.S. branches are assumed to rollover loans under tighter credit quality conditions, while retail deposits remain relatively stable throughout the crisis. Head Office monitors events within the U.S. and, as the crisis’ effects have yet to arrive in China, is assumed to support U.S. branches. At 30 days, U.S. macroeconomic conditions further deteriorate, with contagion to China remaining a distinct possibility.

系统性危机的监测与报告与个体性压力事件相同。由于系统性危机是整个市场的流动性出现问题导致的，中国银行需要密切关注宏观经济及外部预警指标，例如美国和中国股票市场的价格波动、银行业的健康程度、批发性融资市场上流动性的可获得性及外汇指标等。指标的数值、量级与变化趋势是系统性压力情景采取行动方案的重要参考依据。A systemic crisis is to be monitored and reported with the same diligence as an idiosyncratic stress event. Since a systemic market crisis is the result of the liquidity of the market at-large, BOC will need to pay close attention to macroeconomic and external warning indicators such as the volatility U.S. and Chinese equity prices, banking sector health, the availability of wholesale market liquidity, and FX indicators, among others. The amount, magnitude, and trends of these indicators will assist in the determination of an action plan in the event of a systemic crisis.

## B-3. 综合（或称“合并”）压力情景Combined Crisis Stress Test Scenario Description

综合压力情景假设同时出现两种最坏的情形，即中国经济急速下滑，GDP增速降至2-3%，全球贸易几近暂停。陡然停止的商业活动对发达经济体和全球性企业造成重创。为应对经济困境，中国开始执行严格的货币管制，停止中美之间的跨境资金往来。这一系列事件引发了系统性的全球经济衰退。A combined crisis scenario assumes the worst of both cases: there is a sharp slowdown in the Chinese economy and GDP growth rate has dropped to 2-3%, virtually immobilizing global trade. This abrupt halt in commercial activity results in significant knock-on effects to developed economies and global corporations. In response to its economic predicament, China instigates strict currency controls, limiting cash flow out of China to the United States. This precipitates a systemic, global economic downturn.

全球经济的衰退造成全球众多企业信用状况的削弱。大宗商品行业，如石油/天然气、煤炭、钢铁和矿产，受到严重影响。作为中国最大的银行之一，相较于其他国有商业银行，中国银行更多地提供国际服务。中国银行的美国分行持有大量石油/天然气行业、航运和钢铁公司的风险暴露，包括中海发展股份有限公司、本溪钢铁（集团）公司、德国蒂普拓普及中石化等公司。相对于其他全球性金融机构，这些风险暴露将对中国银行造成更严重的影响及更大的贷款损失。与其他陷入危机的银行相比，拥有这些风险特征的中国银行将产生个体性危机，面临市场信心的急剧下降。The global downturn impairs the credit profile of many companies worldwide. Commodity-focused industries such as oil/gas, coal, steel, and mining are particularly impacted. As one of the largest banks in China, BOC is focused on providing international services more than other state-owned peers. BOC U.S. branches have significant exposure to the oil/gas industry, shipping, and steel companies with exposures to China Shipping Development, BX Steel, Tiptop and Sinopec. These exposures result in a substantially disproportionate impact on BOC, with larger loan losses relative to other global financial institutions. This precarious position in which BOC finds itself compared to already distressed banks results in an idiosyncratic crisis, with market-wide confidence in BOC faltering precipitously.

在这种情景下，中国银行的美国分行将经历风险敏感客户的大量存款流失。由于对自身的流动性前景产生担忧，中国银行总行将从海外分行处撤回多余资金，因此无法对美国分支机构提供流动性支持。同时，因中国银行正处于本轮危机情景中，无法从批发性融资市场获得资金。In such a scenario, BOC U.S. branches experience significant deposit runoff from credit-sensitive depositors. Frantic about their own liquidity prospects, BOC Head Office repatriates excess funds from overseas branches and consequently fails to provide liquidity support to U.S. operations. Moreover, wholesale funding is not available while BOC is under name crisis stress.

尽管在危机情景中零售存款尚属稳定，但由于零售存款仅占流动性来源的极小部分，中国银行仍处于不稳定的状况中。由于流动性来源的外部选择有限，中国银行美国分行将对其自身的集团内贷款进行展期。此外，美国分行将对优质企业类交易对手进行及时、频繁的沟通与安抚，以确保在危机情景下，客户关系仍得以维护。Despite the stability of its retail deposit cushion throughout the stress event, BOC still finds itself in a dubious situation, as retail deposits constitute a very small portion of its liquidity base. Due to its limited assortment of external options to bolster its liquidity position, BOC U.S. branches rollover certain loans within the BOC internal network. Furthermore, BOC U.S. branches place reassurance of and frequent communication with select corporate counterparties as a top priority with the objective of maintaining these important relationships throughout and beyond the stress event.


在危机发生的第30天，宏观经济状况持续恶化，但恶化节奏放缓。政府采取适当、及时的干预，因此预计总行危机将在30天后得到缓解。这种来自政府的必要支持确保总行可向美国分行提供资金调拨，从而避免重大现金流短缺，甚至破产。At the 30-day mark of the combined stress event, macroeconomic conditions are assumed to continue deteriorating, but at a more moderate pace. Additionally, it is expected that the BOC Head Office position fortifies after 30 days due to appropriate and timely government intervention. This necessary support enables BOC Head Office to provide support to the U.S. Branches, staving off the realization of a major funding shortfall or, worse, insolvency.

# 附件三：预警指标Appendix C: Early Warning Indicators

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 中国银行预警指标 | 橙色预警 | 红色警告 | | |
| 宏观经济与外部市场指标 |  |  | | |
| 中国主权评级下调 | 标普、穆迪及惠誉中任何一家对评级下调一级或以上 | 不适用 | |
| 五年期中国主权债的信用违约掉期 | 大于180 bp | 大于 300 bp | |
| 人民币日间汇率贬值 | 大于 3% | 大于 6% | |
| 人民币一个月内汇率累计贬值 | 大于10% | 大于20% | |
| 上证综合指数每日变动 | 日跌幅超过8% | 不适用 | |
| 中国GDP增速 | 小于 3% | 小于 1% | |
| 其他主要中资银行纽约分行（中国工商银行、中国建设银行和中国农业银行）一个月的美元融资成本（银行间拆借和扬基存单）中值增加 | 大于 1个月LIBOR+70 bp | 大于1 个月 LIBOR +120 bp | |
| 中国工商银行的五年期信用违约掉期 | 大于200bp | 大于400bp | |
| VIX恐慌指数每日变动（仅考虑正向变动） | 大于15 | 不适用 | |
| 穆迪公司债与国债信用利差 | 大于5% | 不适用 | |
| 其他主要中资银行（中国工商银行、中国建设银行和中国农业银行）的信用评级下调 | 标普、穆迪及惠誉中任何一家对评级下调一级或以上 | 不适用 | |
| 任何可能影响流动性的事件和新闻 | 任何此类事件或新闻发生 | 不适用 | |
| 内部财务业绩指标 | | | | |
| 中国银行股票价格相对上证综合指数大幅变动（3日变动数） | 股票价格大幅下跌，导致3天内与上证综合指数的偏离  累计超过20% | 不适用 | |
| 内部流动性指标 |  | |  | |
| 单一第三方提供的资金占总资产的比例 | 大于 25% | 大于 30% | |
| 当日联储余额预计值 | 小于20亿美元 | 不适用 | |
| 中国银行个体性市场指标 |  | |  | |
| 对中国银行或纽约分行负面新闻 | 会对中国银行全球经营或者纽约分行产生直接负面影响的重大新闻，包括监管处罚，反洗钱问题，法律诉讼问题，对外违约，大额实际亏损等。 | 不适用 | |
| 中国银行信用评级下调 | 标普、穆迪及惠誉中任何一家对评级下调一级或以上 | 不适用 | |
| 五年期中国银行信用违约掉期 | 大于 200 bp | 大于 400 bp | |
| 交易对手暂停信用额度 | 由于对风险的担忧，某主要交易对手暂停对中国银行的信用限额 | 不适用 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| BOC Early Warning Indicators | Amber Threshold | Red Threshold | | |
| Macroeconomic and External Market Indicators |  |  | | |
| Downgrade of China sovereign credit rating | Downgrade of credit rating by any rating agency of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch of 1 notch or more | N/A | |
| Chinese sovereign 5 year bond credit default swap | Above 180 bp | Above 300 bp | |
| Daily RMB exchange rate change | Above 3 pct | Above 6 pct | |
| 1 month RMB exchange rate change | Above 10 percent | Above 20 percent | |
| Daily Shanghai Composite index change | Decrease 8 percent | N/A | |
| China GDP growth | Below 3 pct | Below 1 pct | |
| Median 1-Mth Cost of Money Market Funding(ABOC NY,CCB NY,ICBC NY) | Above 1month LIBOR+70 bp | Above 1 month LIBOR +120 bp | |
| ICBC 5 Yr CDS Spread | Above 200 bp | Above 400 bp | |
| Daily VIX Change (positive change only) | Above 15 | N/A | |
| Moody’s Corporate Credit Spread | Above 5% | N/A | |
| Downgrade of other Chinese major bank (Industrial Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of China) credit rating | Downgrade of credit rating by any rating agency of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch of 1 notch or more | N/A | |
| Any market or news event that may impact liquidity | Any Relevant News or Events | N/A | |
| Financial Performance Indicators | | | | |
| Significant drop of BOC share price | Significant share price drop leading to deviation from the Shanghai Composite Index by 20% cumulatively in 3 days | N/A | |
| Internal Liquidity Indicators |  | |  | |
| Single Third Party Provider Funding Concentration as a Percentage of Total Assets | Above 25 pct | Above 30 pct | |
| Projected EOD Fed Balance | Below 2 Billion USD | N/A | |
| BOC Specific Market Indicators |  | |  | |
| Negative news of BOC or BOC NY | Major news that has a global negative influence on BOC or a direct influence on BOC NY liquidity, including regulatory penalty actions, AML events, litigations and credit default to outside parties, large actual losses , etc. | N/A | |
| Downgrade of BOC credit rating | Downgrade of credit rating by any rating agency of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch of 1 notch or more | N/A | |
| BOC 5 Yr CDS Spread | Above 200 bp | Above 400 bp | |
| Suspense of credit limit by counterparty | Suspense of credit limit by single frequently traded major counterparty action due to risk concern | N/A | |

# 附件四：沟通流程图Appendix D: Communication Process Flowchart



# 附件五： 各部门对于应急资金来源可获资金量以及所需时间估计 Appendix E: Estimation of Amount and Time Needed for Contingent Liquidity and Funding Countermeasures from Relevant Departments

下表是银行可用的应急资金来源与融资措施的量化估计，其提供了个体性压力情景、系统性压力情景和综合压力情景下相关部门对于各种应急资金来源的预计累积现金流入和完成所需时间的估计。The below table is a quantitative assessment of the liquidity sources and funding countermeasures available to the bank, which provides relevant department’s estimate of cumulative cash inflow and time to completion of each funding source under the systemic, idiosyncratic, and combined stress scenarios.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 应急资金来源 （数据截止2021年9月10日） | 相关部门 | 系统性情景下预计累积现金流入（百万） | 系统性情景下预计完成所需时间（天） | 个体性情景下预计累积现金流入（百万） | 个体性情景下预计完成所需时间（天） | 综合情景下预计累积现金流入（百万） | 综合情景下预计完成所需时间（天） |
| 获得总行支持 | 司库/金融市场部 | 5,000 | 30 | 3,500 | 30 | 3,500 | 30 |
| 证券回购 | 金融市场部 | 2,500 | 2 | 2,000 | 2 | 2,000 | 2 |
| 提高批发市场融资金额 | 金融市场部 | 2,200 | 30 | 1,100 | 30 | 1,100 | 30 |
| 金融市场部暂停定期拆放 | 金融市场部 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 调整或卖出投资组合增加流动性 | 金融市场部 | 2,200 | 5 | 2,200 | 5 | 1,800 | 5 |
| 贷款及便利暂停发放 | 公司业务部 | 50 | 90 | 50 | 90 | 50 | 90 |
| 出售贷款组合 | 公司业务部 | 100 | 90 | 100 | 90 | 100 | 90 |
| 贷款及便利暂停发放 | 贸易金融部 | 1203 | 90 | 1203 | 90 | 1203 | 90 |
| 出售贷款组合 | 贸易金融部 | - | - | 732 | 90 | - | - |
| 从美联储贴现窗口借款 | 清算部、运营服务部和金融市场部 | 1000+ | 2 | 1000+ | 2 | 1000+ | 2 |

注:大宗贸易中心的贷款已包含在公司业务部和贸易金融部统计中。

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CFP Funding Source as of September 10, 2021 | Relevant Department | Systemic scenario estimated cumulative cash inflow (MM) | Systemic scenario estimated time to completion (Days) | Idiosyncratic scenario estimated cumulative cash inflow (MM) | Idiosyncratic scenario estimated time to completion (Days) | Combined scenario estimated cumulative cash inflow (MM) | Combined scenario estimated time to completion (Days) |
| Assistance from Head Office | TRY/MKD | 5,000 | 30 | 3,500 | 30 | 3,500 | 30 |
| Execute REPO Transactions | MKD | 2,500 | 2 | 2,000 | 2 | 2,000 | 2 |
| Increase borrowing in wholesale markets | MKD | 2,200 | 30 | 1,100 | 30 | 1,100 | 30 |
| Suspend term lending | MKD | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Rebalance or sale of investment portfolio | MKD | 2,200 | 5 | 2,200 | 5 | 1,800 | 5 |
| Suspend loans & Commitment | CBD | 50 | 90 | 50 | 90 | 50 | 90 |
| Sale of loans | CBD | 100 | 90 | 100 | 90 | 100 | 90 |
| Suspend loans & Commitment | TSD | 1203 | 90 | 1203 | 90 | 1203 | 90 |
| Sale of loans | TSD | - | - | 732 | 90 | - | - |
| Borrow from discount window | CLD, OSD, and MKD | 1000+ | 2 | 1000+ | 2 | 1000+ | 2 |

Note: CBC’s number has been included in CBD and TSD calculation.

# 附件六：专业术语表Appendix G: Glossary

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 缩写/统称 | 全称 |
| 资产负债管理委员会 | 纽约分行资产负债管理委员会 |
| 正常 | 预警指标阈值：正常 |
| BCD | 交易商大额存单 |
| 中国银行 | 中国银行股份有限公司 |
| 纽约分行 | 中国银行纽约分行及其下属分支机构 |
| 应急预案 | 应急预案 |
| 强化审慎标准 | 美联储强化审慎监管规则 |
| 全面风险管理部 | 纽约分行全面风险管理部 |
| 预警指标 | 预警指标 |
| 司库 | 纽约分行司库 |
| 司库总经理 | 纽约分行司库总经理 |
| 工作小组/危机处理小组 | 流动性危机处理小组 |
| 市场风险管理部 | 纽约分行市场风险管理部 |
| 金融市场部 | 纽约分行金融市场部 |
| 资金中台部 | 纽约分行资金中台部 |
| 首席风险官 | 纽约分行首席风险官 |
| 美国风险与管理委员会 | 美国风险与管理委员会 |
| YCD | 扬基定期存单 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Abbreviation | Name |
| ALCO | BOCNY Asset and Liability Committee |
| BAU | Business for usual |
| BCD | Brokered Certificate of Deposit |
| BOC | Bank of China Limited |
| BOCNY | BOC New York Branch and its satellite branches |
| CFP | Contingency Funding Plan |
| EPS | Enhanced Prudential Standards |
| ERM | BOCNY Enterprise Risk Management Department |
| EWI | Early Warning Indicators |
| TRY | BOCNY Treasury |
| Head of TRY | The Head of BOCNY Treasury |
| LCMT | The Liquidity Crisis Management Team |
| MRD | BOCNY Market Risk Department |
| MKD | BOCNY Global Markets Department |
| MOD | BOCNY Treasury Middle Office Department |
| CRO | Chief Risk Officer |
| U.S. Risk & Management Committee | U.S. Risk & Management Committee |
| YCD | Yankee Certificate of Deposit |